KAPIT, PASANG MASDA, AITODAP, ACTO, Atty. Juman B. Paa, and Philippine National Taxi Operators Association parties v. Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela, Parañaque, Muntinlupa, LTO, and MMDA

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Procedural rules are not suspended by mere prominence of the controversy presented. More so when it concerns the absence of the essential requisites of justiciability. The Court cannot act when its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Any pronouncement on the merits would be premature and advisory in nature. To rule on the substantive issues despite the procedural defects would be judicial overreach.

Before this Court are three consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition with prayers for injunctive relief, all seeking nullification of city ordinances implementing the No Contact Apprehension Policy (NCAP) in certain cities in Metro Manila (NCAP City Ordinances) for being in contravention of national statutes and violative of constitutionally protected rights:

1. G.R. No. 261892: Petition¹ filed by petitioners Kilusan sa Pagbabago ng Industriya ng Transportasyon, Inc. (KAPIT), Pangkalahatang Sanggunian Manila & Suburbs Drivers Association Nationwide, Inc. (PASANG MASDA), Alliance of Transport Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines (ALTODAP), and Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) (collectively, KAPIT et al.) against City of Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, Parañaque City, Muntinlupa City, (collectively, respondent LGUs) and the Land Transportation Office (LTO);

2. G.R. No. 262192: Petition² filed by petitioner Atty. Juman B. Paa (Atty. Paa) against respondents Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Maynila and Hon. Dr. Maria Sheilah Lacuna-Pangan, in her capacity as then incumbent mayor of City of Manila; and

3. G.R. No. 263752: Petition³ filed by petitioners Philippine National Taxi Operators Association, Manuel C. Cruz, and Jacqueline V. Serrano (collectively, PNTOA et al.) against respondent LGUs and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

At first glance, the controversy at hand appears ground-breaking, far-reaching, and even intimidating. But courts decide cases based on jurisdiction, not on appearances. We cannot just disregard the requisite procedural stages and "skip to the good part," so to speak. We find that the Petitions are marred by fundamental procedural defects that preclude Us from exercising Our power of judicial review.

Antecedents

The MMDA sought to establish a technology-driven, no contact traffic enforcement system to shift from immediate physical apprehension to post-violation notification and adjudication.⁴

To this end, the Metro Manila Council (MMC) issued Resolutions,⁵ including MMDA Resolution No. 16-01 (MMDA NCAP), to adopt and implement a "No Physical Contact Policy" for apprehension of traffic violators through the use of digital cameras. The move aimed to reduce traffic congestion and curb opportunities for corruption. The MMC later authorized the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, digital imaging, and similar technologies to detect and document traffic violations along major roads in Metro Manila. It also prescribed detailed procedures for camera-based apprehension, including issuance of notices of violation, payment of fines, and the right of violators to contest the citation before the Traffic Adjudication Board or the MMDA Traffic Adjudication Division.⁶

Respondent LGUs subsequently promulgated and implemented the assailed NCAP City Ordinances, prompting the filing of three separate Petitions that We resolved to consolidate.⁷ Prior to the filing of PNTOA et al.'s petition, it was manifested that the MMDA was not impleaded as a party to the Petitions and that none of the petitions assail the MMDA NCAP. The Court then resolved to order the inclusion of MMDA as a party and to require its comment.⁸ Later, the Court also resolved to include QPAX Traffic Systems Incorporated (QPAX) as respondent in the consolidated cases.⁹

Arguments of the Parties

Assailing the legality of the NCAP as implemented by the MMDA and respondent LGUs, KAPIT et al. allege that the NCAP is contrary to Sections 29¹⁰ in relation to 62¹¹ of Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which contemplates face-to-face apprehension and imposes liability on erring driver, not registered owners. They further claim that the NCAP violates due process, as motorists are imposed penalties without immediate notice or opportunity to contest the violation at the time of recording, and face accumulated fines without prior notice. They contend that it disregards privacy and data protection rights, as there are inadequate safeguards for the collection and use of personal and vehicle data. Finally, they argue that the presumptive violator is automatically the registered vehicle owner, regardless of the actual driver.¹²

Specific to the City of Manila's NCAP ordinance, Atty. Paa avers that the ordinance violates his fundamental rights to due process and privacy, as well as his right against excessive fines and penalties. He alleges that he only discovered his four traffic violations in 2021 when he was refused registration of his motor vehicle in 2022. The total fines with penalties reached PHP 20,360.00. He observes that his address in the notices was incorrect, demonstrating how the NCAP system is error-prone, burdensome, and prejudicial to registered owners who may not be the actual drivers who committed the traffic violation.¹³

Echoing the first two petitions, PNTOA et al. argue that the NCAP City Ordinances are unconstitutional for violating the fundamental tenets of due process and Republic Act No. 4136. They posit that granting exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide NCAP-related traffic violations to respondent LGUs' respective traffic adjudication boards contravenes both Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Article VIII, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution.¹⁴ Markedly, PNTOA et al. declare that they previously filed a petition against Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau and the Manila Traffic Adjudication Board before Branch 16, Regional Trial Court of Manila assailing the city's NCAP implementation (RTC Manila case). The trial court suspended the resolution of their motion for Reconsideration in view of the filing of their Petition before this Court.¹⁵

In their respective comments, respondent LGUs move for the dismissal of the consolidated Petitions on procedural and substantive grounds.

Procedurally, respondent LGUs similarly cite failure to establish all the requirements for judicial review, specifically actual case or controversy and standing, as grounds for dismissal of the Petitions. They also contend that the petitions violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The City of Manila further alleges forum shopping against PASANG MASDA and ACTO, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies against Atty. Paa. Quezon City adds improper recourse as a ground stating that the Court is not a trier of facts.¹⁶ The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also informed the Court that a Petition for Injunction¹⁷ was previously filed by Malcolm Law Offices and petitioner KAPIT against the MMDA and the LTO, pending before Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati Case), without disclosing said case in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to their Petition.¹⁸

On the merits, respondent LGUs are one in arguing that the NCAP is a valid exercise of police power. The LTO, through the OSG, maintains that the NCAP is a valid traffic enforcement mechanism that is consistent with the government's authority to regulate road use. Respondent LGUs assert that the NCAP, as implemented through a local ordinance, is a valid exercise of delegated police power under the Local Government Code. They submit that the NCAP operates to promote traffic discipline, efficient road use, and public safety. The MMDA reasons that the NCAP is a valid exercise of its traffic management and regulatory authority, supported by its charter and relevant laws, and implemented in coordination with LGUs. It states that the use of technology enhances enforcement and minimizes corruption and traffic disruption.¹⁹

Respondent LGUs also similarly counter that there is no violation of due process since registered owners are given the opportunity to contest the notice of violation and imposition of penalties before the appropriate adjudicatory body.²⁰

Respondent LGUs and MMDA assert that the NCAP does not violate Republic Act No. 4136, as the law does not limit apprehension of traffic violators to face-to-face apprehension.²¹

The City of Manila and Quezon City further remark that the NCAP City Ordinances enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, which petitioners failed to overcome.²² As to Atty. Paa, the City of Manila posits that submission of correct information is the duty of the registered owner and is not the burden of the local government.²³

The MMDA also argues that the MMDA NCAP and the NCAP City Ordinances do not violate a motorist's right to privacy.²⁴

Meanwhile, QPAX maintains that its role is limited to providing the infrastructure for traffic enforcement. The authority to apprehend, adjudicate, and penalize violators remains with government agencies and LGUs. QPAX further contends that the use of its automated detection systems reliably enhances traffic enforcement, and the NCAP framework has safeguards that ensure due process and accuracy in the identification and processing of violations.²⁵

In response to QPAX, the LTO emphasize that they do not have privity of contract with QPAX. LTO adds that the information necessary to carry out the functions of public authorities lie outside the scope of the Data Privacy Act of 2012.²⁶

Issuance and lifting the Temporary Restraining Order

On August 30, 2022, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)²⁷ enjoining respondent LGUs, the LTO, and all parties acting for and on their behalf from implementing MMDA NCAP and NCAP City Ordinances until further orders from the Court. The LTO was likewise commanded to cease from providing motorist information to all LGUs enforcing the NCAP.²⁸

The LTO and the MMDA thereafter manifested that the MMC adopted and approved the Single Ticketing System through MMDA Resolution No. 23-02, series of 2023 to harmonize existing national and local laws on traffic enforcement for the establishment of an effective transport and traffic management system in Metro Manila. On February 1, 2023, the MMC adopted and approved the establishment of the Metro Manila Traffic Code of 2023 (MMTC 2023). The MMDA, mindful of the operation of the August 30, 2022 TRO, limited the scope of their pilot testing of the single ticketing system to physical or contact apprehensions. The MMTC 2023 provides a common definition of the traffic violations in the Single Ticketing System, as well as the Unified Ordinance Violation Receipt, which allows traffic violators to settle their penalties anywhere in Metro Manila. The Court was also informed that respondent LGUs enacted ordinances adopting the MMTC 2023. With the adoption of the MMTC 2023 and the subsequent passage of new ordinances by the respondent LGUs, the LTO and the MMDA submit that the Petitions may have been rendered moot.²⁹

KAPIT et al. opposed the manifestation, arguing that their Petition is not rendered moot by the alleged supervening events.³⁰

On May 8, 2025, the MMDA filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Partial Lifting of TRO (Motion to Lift TRO).³¹ It emphasizes that none of the petitioners in the consolidated Petitions question the validity of the MMDA NCAP. It cites the existence of the MMTC 2023, the impending rehabilitation of EDSA, the volume of vehicles, and the limited deployment of MMDA and LGU traffic enforcers, along with the significant number of recorded traffic violations—numbering 833,097 from the issuance of the August 30, 2022 TRO to the end of April 2025—as reasons for the lifting of the TRO against the MMDA NCAP.

In the Resolution³² dated May 20, 2025, We granted, among others, the MMDA's Motion to Lift TRO. The TRO is lifted only with respect to the circumferential³³ and radial³⁴ roads in Metro Manila, which are under the MMDA's traffic enforcement jurisdiction.

Atty. Paa moved for reconsideration of the lifting of the TRO as to the MMDA.³⁵

For their part, respondent LGUs manifested that should the TRO be lifted for them, they can only implement the NCAP in the same manner as the MMDA, as they have adopted the MMTC 2023 in their respective jurisdictions.³⁶ Respondent LGUs later prayed that the TRO against them be lifted.³⁷

Issues

The issues presented by the parties are summarized as follows:

I. Procedural Issues

1. Whether the issues raised in the Petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;

2. Whether petitioners have legal capacity to sue;

3. Whether petitioners each have locus standi;

4. Whether petitioners' direct resort to the Supreme Court is proper; and

5. Whether petitioner KAPIT committed forum shopping in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. Substantive Issues

6. Whether the implementation of the NCAP is a valid exercise of police power;

7. Whether the NCAP City Ordinances violate the constitutional right to privacy;

8. Whether the NCAP City Ordinances violate the constitutional right against excessive fines and penalties;

9. Whether the implementation of the NCAP City Ordinances is a valid exercise of local autonomy;

10. Whether the NCAP City Ordinances violate the provisions of Republic Act No. 4136;

11. Whether the payment of penalties for violations of the NCAP City Ordinances can be made a condition for the renewal of motor vehicle registration under Republic Act No. 4136;

12. Whether the condition of payment of penalties before renewal of motor vehicle registrations violates the two-month prescriptive period for the violation of municipal ordinances under Act No. 3326;

13. Whether the NCAP City Ordinances can be declared unconstitutional if the Court finds that their implementation violated specific provisions of the Data Privacy Act of 2012;

14. Whether the operative fact doctrine shall apply if the NCAP is declared unconstitutional; and

15. Whether the NCAP City Ordinances constitute a usurpation of legislative authority for expanding the coverage of traffic regulations under Republic Act No. 4136.³⁸

Ruling of the Court

After a careful and thorough consideration of all the arguments that have been raised by the parties, We hold that the resolution of threshold issues, or preliminary questions that determine whether the Court may validly exercise its power of judicial review, is of paramount importance. These are not merely procedural technicalities but are jurisdictional in character defining both the powers and the constitutional boundaries of the Court.

The doctrine of constitutional avoidance directs the Court to refrain from resolving constitutional questions where a case may be disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds:

This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to answer all of life's questions. No question, no matter how interesting or compelling, can be answered by this Court if it cannot be shown that there is an "actual and an antagonistic assertion of rights by one party against the other in a controversy wherein judicial intervention is unavoidable."

This Court does not issue advisory opinions. We do not act to satisfy academic questions or dabble in thought experiments. We do not decide hypothetical, feigned, or abstract disputes, or those collusively arranged by parties without real adverse interests. If this Court were to do otherwise and jump headlong into ruling on every matter brought before us, we may close off avenues for opportune, future litigation. We may forestall proper adjudication for when there are actual, concrete, adversarial positions, rather than mere conjectural posturing[.]³⁹

As act of constitutional fidelity, the Court thus confines itself to the disposition of threshold issues, which petitioners failed to hurdle. The consolidated Petitions are fraught with defects sufficient to warrant their dismissal without a discussion of the merits. We rule in this manner without prejudice to the invocation of the substantive and constitutional questions in a petition that adequately satisfies the requisites of judicial review.

I. Actual case or controversy and mootness

The power of judicial review is anchored upon Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, which articulates the traditional and expanded concepts of judicial power:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Traditionally, judicial power is confined to settling actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable rights. Under this concept, "the judiciary involves itself with controversies brought about by rights, whether public or private, which are demandable and enforceable against another."⁴⁰

On the other hand, the expanded scope of judicial power, i.e., the power to determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or instrumentality, was introduced in the present Constitution.⁴¹ This was aimed to "prevent courts from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to abuses committed by the other branches of government." In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,⁴² the Court recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant "[t]o ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of the government."⁴³ Under this concept, the court "does not address the rights that a private party may demand of another party, whether public or private."⁴⁴ Rather, "it solely addresses the relationships of parties to any branch or instrumentality of the government, and the rights that a party may have against the latter in its exercise of discretion to the petitioning party's prejudice."⁴⁵

In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,⁴⁶ the Court further expounded that these concepts of judicial power may be sought in two situations, which entail distinct requirements for its exercise. The first is the constitutional situation—where the validity of an executive or legislative act, including those of constitutional bodies and administrative agencies, is challenged for being repugnant to the Constitution. The second is the nonconstitutional situation—where no constitutional question is raised, but the Court nonetheless intervenes when a governmental act is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Regardless of whether the Court acts pursuant to its traditional or expanded jurisdiction or whether the matter involves a constitutional question or otherwise, the existence of an actual case or controversy remains an absolute and indispensable prerequisite of judicial review. Simply put, there can be no judicial review without an actual case or controversy in view of the express constitutional command to only settle actual controversies and determine grave abuse of discretion. Too, this requirement proceeds from the time-honored principle of separation of powers of the three branches of government, which precludes the Judiciary from resolving hypothetical questions that will effectively render them an advisory body to the other political branches, instrumentality, or agency of the government. Thus, emphatically, where no genuine dispute exists between adversarial parties with real and substantial interests at stake, this Court is without jurisdiction to act. To do otherwise would be to transgress the constitutional boundaries of judicial power and to render an advisory opinion—a function this Court does not possess.

The existence of such a case or controversy is not presumed. It must be established through the petitioner's allegations, evaluated against Our basic procedural requisites as shaped by the requirements of standing (of the petitioners to lodge the case) and ripeness (of the controversy for adjudication). Mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act would not suffice to satisfy the requirement of an actual case or controversy. The kindred notion of ripeness also demands that the challenged governmental act have a direct adverse impact on the party seeking relief. More specifically, the precept of ripeness, at its core, is concerned with the timeliness of seeking judicial intervention—it relates to prematurity. Courts cannot act to preempt the actions of the parties.

In Abakada Guro Partylist, Inc. v. Purisima,⁴⁷ We categorically ruled that "a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication, when the governmental act being challenged has a direct and existing adverse effect on the individual challenging it."⁴⁸ Verily, for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "the petitioner[s] must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to [themselves] that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court."⁴⁹ A conjectural or anticipatory dispute fails to meet the requisite standard, as it simply seeks the Court's advisory opinion regarding the applicable law in a hypothetical scenario.

Furthermore, also intrinsic to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the separate concept of mootness. In contrast to the concept of prematurity, mootness relates to the belated or unnecessary judgment on the issues. Indeed, not only must the Court refrain from acting in preemption, it must also abstain from passing upon the merits of a case where legal relief is no longer necessary nor called for.

In Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration,⁵⁰ We explained:

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.⁵¹ (Emphasis supplied)

Here, supervening circumstances have since arisen that materially transformed the regulatory milieu at the heart of these consolidated Petitions. The legal and factual terrains upon which the challenged NCAP City Ordinances once operated have been substantially altered, such that the scope and efficacy of said Ordinances can no longer be assessed within the framework originally presented by the petitioners. The issues tendered for this Court's resolution have been overtaken by such events, rendering them effectively moot and beyond the necessity of judicial determination.

It bears emphasis that the instant Petitions were instituted to assail the NCAP City Ordinances—measures that respondent LGUs had each independently enacted and enforced—on grounds of unconstitutionality and grave abuse of discretion. Upon the issuance by this Court of a TRO in August 2022, respondent LGUs uniformly suspended the operation of their respective NCAP City Ordinances in compliance with the Court's directive. The TRO likewise included the MMDA NCAP. Subsequently, the MMC issued the MMTC 2023, which aims "to harmonize the existing national and local laws on traffic enforcement to establish effective transport and traffic management in Metro Manila."⁵² Significantly, the MMTC 2023 features the following for the standardized observance of NCAP in Metro Manila:

a. Institutionalization of a Uniform Traffic Adjudication System for traffic contests/protests in all LGUs in Metro Manila.

- Provides for the procedure in filing contests before the Traffic Adjudication Board (TAB) and appeals in case of an unfavorable decision by the TAB.

- Apprehended traffic violators now have 10 days from notice to settle the Notice of Violation or to file a protest.

- Provision of prescription.

- Procedure for issuance of notice of violation to the traffic violator or registered owner of the motor vehicle prior to tagging.

- Introduction of "other modes" of serving of Notices of Violation, which now include personal service, registered mail or ordinary mail, private or government couriers, and through electronic mail.

b. Procedure for tagging traffic violations in the LTO's Land Transportation Management System (LTMS).

c. Clear guidelines on strict compliance with the Data Privacy Act of 2012 concerning all information/data collected from apprehended violators.

d. List of common traffic violations covered by the MMTC 2023 which can be apprehended through NCAP.

e. Uniform fines/penalties for traffic violations under the MMTC 2023 based on the median amount of the LGUs[‘], respondent MMDA's and respondent LTO's respective fines/penalty matrices.

f. List of online payment platforms as well as partner banks where traffic violators may settle their traffic violation penalties/fines.

g. Guidelines on the mandatory "authorization process" of all Information Technology systems that will be used in enforcing the various NCAP systems in Metro Manila.⁵³

This was followed by the promulgation of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2025, which provided guidelines for the NCAP implementation, incorporating the requirements and standards laid down in MMTC 2023.

Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, and Valenzuela City then enacted ordinances adopting the MMTC 2023 parameters for their respective NCAP implementation. For its part, the City of Manila manifested that it also enacted an ordinance adopting the MMTC 2023, except the provision on the establishment of a Traffic Adjudication Board since its own Traffic Adjudication Board continues to perform its functions.

These developments have effectively rendered the decentralized and fragmented enforcement of the NCAP a legal nullity. Notably, respondent LGUs have not resumed independent implementation of the NCAP. On the contrary, they have subordinated their traffic regulations to the uniform standards prescribed by the MMDA. It necessarily follows that the Ordinances subject of the challenges have been, for all intents and purposes, functionally abrogated.

To engage in a resolution of the constitutional and legal challenges leveled against the assailed NCAP City Ordinances would be, at this juncture, a patently futile judicial exercise. Those Ordinances have been rendered functus officio by the subsequent enactments of the concerned LGUs, all of which have been calibrated in conformity with the MMTC 2023, which is not being challenged in these petitions or in any other forum. The jurisdiction of this Court in the present controversy extends no further than an assessment of the validity of those already superseded measures. Any declaration of their unconstitutionality or their infirmity on account of grave abuse of discretion would produce neither legal nor practical effect of any moment. The superseding Ordinances, together with the MMTC 2023 upon which they were faithfully modeled, shall endure in full force and effect, untouched and unimpeached by such a pronouncement as they are not challenged in this forum. The relief sought, in fine, would be illusory.

Judicial restraint leads this Court to the dismissal of the Petitions without prejudice to future challenges should the modified implementation give rise to an actual justiciable case. Indeed, dismissal due to mootness, and mootness alone, is the only path consistent with Our long-standing commitment to decide only actual controversies.

In ruling so, We are mindful that the mootness principle is not an impenetrable shield. In the landmark case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,⁵⁴ We recognized exceptions under which this Court may resolve an otherwise moot case: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.⁵⁵ However, none of these exceptions adequately apply in these cases.

a. Grave violation of the Constitution

Petitioners argue that the NCAP City Ordinances offend the constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and protection against excessive fines. To be sure, this Court would not lightly dismiss these concerns. These invoked rights are real, anchored in the Constitution, and worthy of judicial solicitude. Nonetheless, the crucial inquiry at this point is not whether these rights were violated under the superseded ordinances, but whether a ruling by this Court on the constitutionality of those now-defunct ordinances would still serve any constitutional purpose. As we have held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,⁵⁶ the exception relating to the grave violation of the Constitution is animated by the Court's duty to prevent ongoing or threatened constitutional injury—not to issue retrospective declarations on ordinances that has already been removed from the legal order by the very acts of the respondents themselves.

On that score, it must be emphasized that the superseding ordinances and the MMTC 2023 are not matters presently before this Court. To rule on the constitutionality of the NCAP City Ordinances as now implemented under the new code would be to pass judgment on a legal instrument that has not been properly challenged, whose implementing rules have not been fully developed in the record, and against which petitioners have not directed their pleadings. This Court cannot, under the guise of the grave violation of the Constitution exception, expand the scope of the controversy beyond what the Petitions actually encompass. The exception requires that the constitutional violation be attributable to the very issuance under challenge—not to a successor instrument yet to be separately assailed, if at all.

b. Exceptional character and paramount public interest

This Court acknowledges that the NCAP is a novel regulatory measure in Our jurisdiction, and its enforcement is a legitimate matter of public interest. However, public interest is not sufficient to justify continued judicial action where the legal landscape has so fundamentally shifted that any pronouncement by this Court would be of no practical use. The exceptional character of the case and paramount public interest have never been taken by this Court as stand-alone licenses to give opinion on public welfare matters through a decision or resolution. Such considerations can never serve as bases for the exercise of judicial power. Our fundamental law is clear: judicial power may only be exercised when a real and subsisting controversy exists.⁵⁷ No invocation of exceptional circumstances or paramount public interest can confer upon this Court jurisdiction it does not possess. Compelling as these considerations may be, they can only supplement, and never substitute for, the threshold requirement of an actual case or controversy for the exercise of judicial power.

More, similar with the grave violation of the Constitution exception, a ruling simply premised on the exceptional character of the case and paramount public interest exception would create a dangerous doctrine of allowing the Court to render pronouncements on the superseded ordinances. The danger in this precedent is its practical effect of prejudging the validity or constitutionality of the MMTC 2023, which is the essence of the superseding ordinances, without it being properly challenged before the Court, without its implementing rules having been fully developed in the evidentiary record, and without the arguments specifically pertaining to it being heard.

Besides, the transcendental importance and/or public interest exception to the mootness principle is applicable only when the case involves interests of the general public, as distinguished from those of a particular class. David involved the chief executive's declaration of a state of national emergency with immediate consequences to any individual's civil liberties.⁵⁸ Araullo v. President Aquino III⁵⁹ involved the Disbursement Acceleration Program with direct and massive implications on public finance. Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa⁶⁰ involved the Priority Development Fund which likewise has direct impact on the management of the public coffers. The recent case of Ocampo v. President Macapagal-Arroyo⁶¹ involved the exploration of a portion of "South China Sea"⁶² which our country considers to be part of its territory. We have previously held that the exploration, development, and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. In contrast, the issues presented in these consolidated cases involve a particular class of public, i.e., the motorists.

c. Need to formulate controlling principles

Deviation from the mootness principle under this exception demands, not only an assertion of transcendental importance, but a showing that existing jurisprudence on the constitutional or legal issues presented is conceptually inadequate, not merely as applied in a given case, but fundamentally insufficient, as a matter of doctrine. More than mere intellectual curiosity, there must be a genuine need for doctrinal guidance to sustain jurisdiction. Otherwise, the discharge of judicial power would be effectively reduced into an academic exercise, in plain contravention of the constitutional requirement of an actual case or controversy.⁶³

Here, the constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and protection against excessive fines as asserted by petitioners are not unexplored terrain in Our jurisdiction. Over decades of adjudication, this Court has meticulously delineated the extent of the protection given by these constitutional guarantees.

Certainly, this Court has already laid down comprehensive doctrine on the right to privacy. In Ople v. Torres,⁶⁴ the Court En Banc declared the Administrative Order No. 308 or the "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" unconstitutional because it facially violates the right to privacy. The Court sufficiently discussed the concept of the right to privacy vis-à-vis the zones of privacy; the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs" to generate a Population Reference Number for every person who will be covered by the system; the possible abuse and misuse of the data gathered under the system; the capability of the computer to produce a dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes; and the need for adequate safeguards in implementing a system that collects personal details. In Vivares v. St. Theresa's College,⁶⁵ the Court further enriched our doctrinal landscape on privacy rights in the digital age, expounding on the evolution of the concept of privacy through time and the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy given the nature of the online social network. In Cadajas v. People,⁶⁶ We discussed the admissibility in a criminal prosecution of evidence which was taken from the social media.

It cannot be gainsaid that case law on substantial and procedural due process is likewise well-developed and readily applicable in labor cases, civil disputes, criminal prosecutions, and administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations⁶⁷ enumerated the cardinal requirements of due process. Albeit formulated for a labor dispute, those requirements have been reproduced and refined to create a framework of guidelines for administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial bodies alike. Additionally, the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are axiomatic.⁶⁸ Notably, the instant Petitions offered no compelling justification for the Court to venture into establishing new due process doctrine/s.

Finally, the constitutional proscription is inapplicable to these cases. In any case, the constitutional provision⁶⁹ on excessive fines is self-executing, and the principles governing it are well-entrenched in Our jurisprudence and supplemented by related legislations.⁷⁰ Thus, there is likewise no significant doctrinal gap that would warrant this Court's intervention in a moot case.

d. Capable of repetition yet evading review

This exception was not meant to be loosely and literally applied.⁷¹ We are not empowered to adjudicate constitutional questions of broad public relevance in a moot case simply because analogous issues might recur in future cases involving different parties. Madrilejos v. Gatdula⁷² explained that this exception requires a showing of "reasonable expectation"⁷³ or "demonstrated probability"⁷⁴ that the same controversy will recur between the same or similarly situated parties. A mere prediction or supposition that related constitutional questions might eventually be raised by anyone, anywhere, in some future proceeding would not suffice. In David, such demonstrated probability of repetition was satisfied by the "history of 'emergencies,"' which had attended then chief executive's administration since she assumed office.⁷⁵ In Belgica, the Court found a reasonable expectation that the questioned Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF in the 2013 General Appropriations Act and its entailing constitutional challenges would re-emerge despite the passage of a PDAF-free budget for 2014 owing to the multifarious iterations of the pork barrel system throughout the course of the history. Too, the "the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.''⁷⁶

In the case of the NCAP, it is highly speculative, if not improbable, that petitioners or those similarly situated would be subjected to the same or similar LGU ordinances. To stress, the challenged ordinances were already superseded by new ones, which adopted the MMTC 2023. It is also notable that all LGU members of the MMC, not just respondent LGUs, acquiesced to the adoption of the uniform traffic code. Thus, at its current iteration, the enforcement of the NCAP now involves parameters and safeguards different from those in the questioned ordinances. A future challenge entails a new factual record. If petitioners believe that the new legal scheme perpetuates the same constitutional and legal infirmities, the proper remedy is a direct challenge to the MMTC 2023 and its implementing issuances. To be sure, the NCAP is a continuing regulatory regime that is capable is full of judicial review. At this point, however, any allegation of injury on grave constitutional violations remains speculative.

All told, the requirement of a justiciable controversy is not a mere creation of case law that this Court may freely discard. It is a constitutional command from which We source Our judicial power. Hence, judicial restraint in ruling upon moot cases remains to be the general rule. Courts must act with utmost care in recognizing and applying exceptions to the mootness doctrine lest We contradict the very grant of judicial power from which We derive Our jurisdiction.

II. Legal standing and capacity to sue

The Court, in Galicto v. President Aquino III,⁷⁷ defined locus standi or legal standing as follows:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."⁷⁸ (Emphasis in the original)

Here, only Atty. Paa could be considered to have sustained a personal and direct injury or be at risk of sustaining a direct injury from the implementation of the assailed City of Manila NCAP Ordinance. This is considering Atty. Paa's allegation that he was constrained to pay the fines with penalties as condition precedent for the registration of his vehicle for 2022-2023 without him being furnished with the notices of violation thereby prejudicing his right to due process.⁷⁹

The same is not true for KAPIT et al. who failed to show personal and direct injury arising from the implementation of the NCAP City Ordinances.

KAPIT et al. assert interest in this case as representative of their members who are public utility transport operators and drivers of public utility vehicles duly authorized by the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB).⁸⁰

Respondent LGUs and MMDA argue that KAPIT et al. neither alleged any actual or threatened injury directly upon them nor do they sufficiently demonstrate third-party standing. The MMDA adds that KAPIT et al. failed to establish the identity of their members and present their authority to bring suit for and on behalf of their members. Neither did they attach their certificates of incorporation to show that they have legal capacity to sue.⁸¹

In their Memorandum, KAPIT et al. reiterate that they have legal capacity to sue as they are corporate entities duly incorporated under Philippine law. In support, they cite the provisions on de facto corporations under the Revised Corporation Code, and that even assuming that their charters were revoked, it does not mean the end of the juridical personality of the corporation. They also argue that they are not only filing the case for their constituency, but also for stakeholders, private operators, motorists, and the general public.⁸²

True, the Court has recognized instances for a liberal approach on the requirement of legal standing. As explained in Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Senate:⁸³

Yet, there are instances when this Court has adopted a liberal stance on the requirement of legal standing. We have taken cognizance of petitions involving matters of "critical significance" even if filed by parties who failed to establish their personal or substantial interest in the challenged acts:

Like any rule, the rule on legal standing has exceptions. This Court has taken cognizance of petitions filed by those who have no personal or substantial interest in the challenged governmental act but whose petitions nevertheless raise "constitutional issue[s] of critical significance." This Court summarized the requirements for granting legal standing to "non-traditional suitors" in Funa v. Villar, thus:

1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance[,] which must be settled early; and

4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as [legislators].

Another exception is the concept of third-party standing. Under this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties provided the following criteria are met: first, "the [party bringing suit] must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving [them] a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute"; second, "the party must have a close relation to the third party"; and third, "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect [their] own interests".⁸⁴

In relation to third-party standing, the discussion of the Court in Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment,⁸⁵ is relevant insofar as KAPIT et al., thus:

As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have standing to bring this suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their members are and if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. While alleging that they are composed of public utility bus operators who will be directly injured by the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof, such as board resolutions of their alleged members or their own articles of incorporation authorizing them to act as their members' representatives in suits involving their members' individual rights.

Some of the petitioners here are not even persons or entities authorized by law or by the Rules allowed to file a suit in court, As intervenor MMDA sufficiently demonstrated, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. had their certificates of incorporation revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission for failure to submit the required general information sheets and financial statements for the years 1996 to 2003. With their certificates of incorporation revoked, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. have no corporate existence. They have no capacity to exercise any corporate power, specifically, the power to sue in their respective corporate names.

Again, the reasons cited—the "far-reaching consequences" and "wide area of coverage and extent of effect" of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001—are reasons not transcendent considering that most administrative issuances of the national government are of wide coverage. These reasons are not special reasons for this Court to brush aside the requirement of legal standing.⁸⁶

This Court finds that PASANG MASDA and ACTO lack the legal capacity to sue. As emphasized by the City of Manila, the two associations are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.⁸⁷

In relation to KAPIT and ALTODAP, the Court also finds that they lack third-party standing since they failed to identify their members and demonstrate that they were allowed by said members to sue on their behalf. Their belated claim that they are not only filing the case for their constituency, but also for stakeholders, private operators, motorists, and the general public, did not save their failure to establish their third-party standing.

III. Exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts

Under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before one is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, one must first avail of all administrative processes as a necessary pre-condition. Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Seludo, Jr. further elucidates:⁸⁸

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.⁸⁹

Atty. Paa justified direct filing of his petition with the Court by claiming that it involves an issue of transcendental importance, emphasizing that the implementation of NCAP affects not only him but all motorists.⁹⁰

The Court is not persuaded.

Here, Atty. Paa did not bother to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies to contest the alleged violation. Based on his allegations, Atty. Paa paid PHP 20,360.00 in penalties to facilitate the registration of the vehicle after failing to obtain a waiver of the penalties. Rather that contest his purported violation and penalties before the proper adjudication board, Atty. Paa went directly before this Court.⁹¹ None of the exceptions was likewise proven to be applicable in this case.

Further, Atty. Paa did not provide sufficient justification for bypassing the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, which exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Thus, there is also a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

The Court, in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,⁹² expounded this doctrine in this guise:

This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the proper venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the issuance of extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition.⁹³

While the doctrine admits of exceptions,⁹⁴ the Court clarified that to invoke any of these exceptions, petitioners must purely raise questions of law. The decisive factor is not the invocation of special and important reasons, but the nature of the question raised in the petition.⁹⁵

Contrary to the claim of Atty. Paa,⁹⁶ his Petition did not raise purely questions of law. There are factual bases that must be established before the Court can definitively rule on the legal questions. As this Court is not a trier of facts, it is best that these are resolved by a court which can receive evidence. On this score, the Court exercises its discretion not to entertain his Petition in its first instance.

IV. Forum shopping

Among the petitioners, KAPIT and PNTOA et al. have previously availed judicial processes before coming to this Court.

We have described forum-shopping as an instance "when a party avails of several judicial remedies in courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court."⁹⁷

Forum shopping, as a ground for dismissal of cases, can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).⁹⁸

The elements of forum shopping are (a) identity of the parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and (c) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other action.⁹⁹

A. KAPIT did not commit forum shopping

To recap, Malcolm Law Offices, KAPIT's initial counsel in the present Petition, was the petitioner in the RTC Makati case. Although KAPIT was also a petitioner, it was subsequently declared unsuited and the case proceeded without KAPIT's involvement. The RTC Makati case questioned the MMDA's authority to issue the MMDA NCAP and the MMC's authority to approve it. Moreover, the MMDA NCAP was alleged to have violated the provisions of Republic Act No. 4136. On the other hand, KAPIT et al. did not implead the MMDA as respondent in their present petition. The MMDA only became a party when this Court ordered it to file its comment. The assailed issuances in KAPIT's petition are the NCAP City Ordinances issued by respondent LGUs, not the MMDA NCAP.¹⁰⁰

Considering that there is no identity of parties and no identity of issues between the present case and the RTC Makati case, We find that KAPIT did not commit forum shopping.

B. PNTOA et al. are guilty of forum shopping

Denying that they committed forum shopping, PNTOA et al. assert that there is no identity of parties and relief sought. They aver that the respondents in the RTC Manila case are the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau and the Manila Traffic Adjudication Board, who are not parties in the present petition. They point out that the RTC Manila case challenged the legality of the notices of violations issued by the City of Manila against PNTOA et al. They also submit that a decision in the present Petition will not necessarily result in res judicata in the RTC Manila case. Finally, they claim compliance in good faith as they disclosed the existence and status of the RTC Manila case and even attached full copies of their initiatory pleading as well as the pertinent order from the trial court.¹⁰¹

We examined PNTOA et al.'s petition in the RTC Manila case and found that they raised the following grounds:

Whether or not Section 3, Paragraph 4 of Ordinance No. 8676 of the City of Manila is invalid.

Whether or not the respondents have valid authority to hear and decide violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations as well as the violations of the City of Manila's traffic ordinances.

Whether or not the respondents have gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding registered owners/operators liable for NCAP if the actual driver of the apprehended vehicle has not paid the fines and penalties as contained in the Notice of Violation.¹⁰²

These belie PNTOA et al.'s claim that they only questioned the legality of the notices of violation, as they also squarely challenged the jurisdiction of the City of Manila's Traffic Adjudication Board.

We find that there is an identity of interest between the parties in the two cases. The difference between the respondents, i.e., the City of Manila on one hand and the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau and the Manila Traffic Adjudication Board on the other, in relation to the present issues is merely nominal. If We rule for the validity of the City of Manila's NCAP ordinances, the RTC Manila can no longer declare that the notices of violations are void.

There is also an identity of issues between the RTC Manila case and PNTOA et al.'s Petition before Us: the City of Manila's NCAP ordinance encroaches on the jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the application of the registered owner rule.

Indeed, PNTOA et al., declared the existence of the RTC Manila case in their Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.¹⁰³ However, mere disclosure of the pendency of the RTC Manila case does not preclude a finding of forum-shopping. The commission of forum shopping is distinct from the disclosure requirement.

Thus, as We dismiss PNTOA et al.'s Petition on the ground of forum shopping, the RTC Manila case is also dismissed. A finding of forum shopping results in summary dismissal of both the Petition before this Court and the related lower court case. This twin dismissal serves to uphold the proper administration of justice.¹⁰⁴

Concluding Notes

We deem it necessary to emphasize, especially for the general public, that Our dismissal of the Petitions should not be taken to mean that the challenged framework is valid. Our dismissal of the Petitions is confined to the determination that petitioners failed to overcome threshold issues, and that the supervening adoption of a uniform regulatory framework has rendered the Petitions moot. There is no explicit determination regarding the prior issuances, nor a resolution of grievances based on specific facts.

However, in view of this Court's several discussions on these Petitions, We allow Ourselves to state that laws and ordinances enjoy the presumption of validity and constitutionality. Legislative and local enactments are approached with deference, mindful that they are products of the political branches acting within their respective spheres. Thus, anyone who assails their validity should be mindful of these presumptions, as well as the burden of clearly and convincingly showing the infirmity of the challenged issuances. Courts will not declare a law or ordinance unconstitutional unless there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Petitioners must overcome these presumptions by more than bare allegations or speculative claims.

In the same breath, We also declare that, in Our democracy, the end does not justify the means. No objective, no matter how laudable, justifies transgression of fundamental human rights. Thus, while the ends sought to be achieved by the government are geared toward progress, the pursuit of such advancement must always be tempered by respect for basic human liberties and the rule of law.

The dismissal of the consolidated Petitions for mootness, lack of standing, violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, and forum-shopping necessitate a reiteration of reminders to ensure proper invocation of this Court's power of judicial review in future cases, especially to those which may challenge traffic enforcement measures and similar regulatory schemes. Again, these reminders should not be construed as a ruling on the constitutionality of the assailed issuances.

A. Judicial remedies are not to be employed as instruments of strategic redundancy

The orderly administration of justice requires candor, restraint, and adherence to procedural rules. The Court will not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions when there is a clear showing of forum-shopping, including the concealment of related cases, nominal difference of parties, or the splitting of causes of action.¹⁰⁵

B. A petitioner must demonstrate concrete and personal injury to claim standing

A petitioner must allege and establish a direct, personal, and substantial injury that is actual or imminent, and not merely speculative or generalized. Mere allegations of possible system errors and speculative effects of imposition of penalties are insufficient. Where notices or sanctions are already invoked, a petitioner must show that such means of enforcement is no longer subject to an administrative or judicial contest.

C. A petitioner must observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and exhaust administrative remedies when applicable

Any direct recourse to this Court is permitted only upon a showing of special and compelling reasons. When the issues involve factual questions, such as the application of a regulatory system, a petitioner must first seek relief from the proper first- or second-level courts or administrative bodies. Where the regulatory framework provides mechanisms to contest enforcement actions, such remedies must be availed of and completed prior to judicial action. A mere invocation of constitutional issues does not dispense with this requirement.

D. A petition must present an actual and justiciable case

A petition must show that the challenged act has a direct and adverse effect on the petitioner. Any claim that is anchored on an anticipated or contingent harm may be dismissed as premature. The Court will not render advisory opinions, or pass upon the validity of policies in the abstract.

E. Actions directly filed before this Court are confined to purely legal questions

Only petitions that raise pure questions of law may justify direct recourse. Such questions must be determinable from the face of the assailed issuances. When issues require reception of evidence, verification of facts, or evaluation of implementation procedures, such will be deemed as improper for resolution through direct filing with this Court.

F. A petitioner must establish continuing justiciability in the face of supervening events

Where the challenged issuance has been modified, discontinued, or abandoned, a petitioner must demonstrate that a live controversy remains, or that the case falls within the recognized exceptions to mootness. The continued need for adjudication must be clearly and specifically shown. An unsubstantiated invocation of transcendental importance will not merit consideration. Similarly, without a concrete showing that the precise controversy is likely to recur as to the same parties and inherently incapable of timely judicial review, the exception to mootness for issues capable of repetition yet evading review does not apply.

Threshold grounds determined the disposal of the present Petitions. Far from being merely technical, these jurisdictional defects foreclose further any inquiry on the substantive issues. The Court refuses to act where its authority has not been properly invoked.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 261892 filed by Kilusan sa Pagbabago ng Industriya ng Transportasyon, Inc., Pangkalahatang Sanggunian Manila & Suburbs Drivers Association Nationwide, Inc., Alliance of Transport Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines, and Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization; G.R. No. 262192 filed by Atty. Juman B. Paa; and G.R. No. 263752 filed by Philippine National Taxi Operators Association, Inc., Manuel C. Cruz, and Jacqueline V. Serrano are DISMISSED for being moot and for failure to satisfy the requisites of judicial review.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 30, 2022 against the City of Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, Parañaque City, Muntinlupa City, the Land Transportation Office, and all parties acting for and on their behalf, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 3–57. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Cease and Desist Order (CDO), Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI), and Other Injunctive Remedies dated August 2, 2022, assailing the following NCAP ordinances:

1. Ordinance No. 8696, Amending the Title and Certain Provisions of Ordinance No. 8676, Entitled: “An Ordinance Implementing the NCAP of the City Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of City Ordinance No. 8092 and Ordinance No. 8327, and for Other Purposes”; 2. Ordinance No. SP-3052, S-2021, An Ordinance Amending City Ordinance No. SP-2785, Series of 2018, Otherwise Known as the Quezon City Revised Traffic Management Code of 2018; 3. Ordinance No. 572, Series of 2019, An Ordinance Amending Section 6 of Article III of Ordinance No. 19, Series of 2005 Otherwise Known as the “Land Transportation Code of Valenzuela City” and Adding Thereto a Chapter on “No Contact Apprehension Program” as Another Means to Implement the Traffic Code of the City; 4. Ordinance No. 587, Series of 2019, An Ordinance Amending Section 3, Sections 140 and 141 of Article XXIV, Chapter VII of Ordinance No. 572, Series of 2019 Otherwise Known as the “No Contact Apprehension Program Ordinance of Valenzuela City”; 5. Ordinance No. 918, Series of 2021, An Ordinance Amending Section 6 of Chapter I, and Amending, Re-Organizing and Renumbering Sections 138 to 148 of Article XXXIII, XXIV, and XXV of Chapters VI and VII of Ordinance No. 19, Series of 2005, Otherwise Known as “The Land Transportation Code of the City of Valenzuela”; 6. Ordinance No. 19-31, Series of 2019, An Ordinance Further Amending Certain Provisions of City Ordinance No. 05-04 Series of 2004 Entitled “An Ordinance Enacting the Parañaque City Traffic Code Subject to Existing Laws and Applicable Rules and Regulations”; 7. Ordinance No. 17-06, Series of 2016, An Ordinance Amending Certain Provisions of City Ordinance No. 05-04 Series of 2004 Entitled “An Ordinance Enacting the Parañaque City Traffic Code Subject to Existing Laws and Applicable Rules and Regulations”; and 8. Ordinance No. 2021-280, An Ordinance Implementing the No Contact Apprehension Program (NCAP) of the City of Muntinlupa, and for Other Purposes.

2. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 3–27. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and WPI dated August 16, 2022, specifically challenging City of Manila's Ordinance No. 8676, An Ordinance Implementing the No Contact Apprehension Program (NCAP) of the City Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of City Ordinance No. 8092 and Ordinance No. 8327 and for Other Purposes.

3. Rollo (G.R. No. 263752), pp. 3–44. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Motion for Consolidation and Motion to Participate in the Scheduled Oral Arguments dated October 18, 2022, seeking to nullify the NCAP ordinances assailed in the other two petitions.

4. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), p. 2684.

5. Id. at 527–531, 1621. The relevant resolutions are as follows:

1. November 7, 2002: MMDA Resolution No. 02-49, Authorizing the MMDA to Adopt a “No Physical Contact Policy” in Apprehending Traffic Violators in Metro Manila Thru the Use of Digital Camera; 2. January 21, 2009: MMDA Resolution No. 09-02, Prescribing the No Physical Contact Policy of MMDA in Apprehending Traffic Violators in Metro Manila Thru the Use and Recording of Digital Camera and/or New Technologies Used in Capturing Images on a Trial Basis for a Period of Ninety Days; and 3. February 16, 2016: MMDA Resolution No. 16-01, Resolution Reimplementing the No-Physical Contact Apprehension of Traffic Violators.

6. Id. at 527–531, 1621.

7. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 77-A–77-B; Rollo (G.R. No. 263752), pp. 187–188. See Resolutions dated August 23, 2022 and November 29, 2022.

8. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 842-A–842-C; 897–900. See Resolutions dated September 20, 2022 and September 27, 2022.

9. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 3857–3859. See Resolution dated April 16, 2024.

10. SECTION 29. Confiscation of driver's licenses.—Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his license.

11. SECTION 62. No provincial board, city or municipal board or council shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act, or prohibiting any deputy or agent of the Commission to enforce this Act within their respective territorial jurisdiction and the provisions of any charter to the contrary notwithstanding.

12. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 28–41.

13. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 6–23.

14. Rollo (G.R. No. 263752), p. 19.

15. Id. at 40–41.

16. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 391–462; 643–672; 843–881; 906–953; 1230–1286; 1413–1454. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 598–642; 1543–1571.

17. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. R-MKT-21-03772-CV.

18. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 842-A–842-C.

19. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 391–462; 643–667; 843–881; 906–946; 1230–1283; 1413–1454. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 598–640; 1543–1568.

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 391–462; 643–672.

23. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), pp. 598–640.

24. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 1230–1286.

25. Id. at 3865–3966.

26. Id. at 4122–4156.

27. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 359–363.

28. Id. at 356–358.

29. Id. at 3601–3614;

30. Id. at 3753–3766.

31. Id. at 4205–4218.

32. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 4265–4267.

33. Id. at 4303. C1, Recto; C2, Mendoza and Pres. Quirino Ave., C3, Araneta Ave.; C4, EDSA; C5, CP Garcia, Katipunan Ave., Tandang Sora.

34. Id. at 4303–4304. R1, Roxas Blvd.; R2, Taft Ave.; R3, South Superhighway; R4, Shaw Blvd.; R5, Ortigas Ave.; R6, Magsaysay Blvd., Aurora Blvd.; R7, Quezon Ave., Commonwealth Ave.; R8, A. Bonifacio; R9, Rizal Ave.; R10, Del Pan, Marcos Highway, McArthur Highway.

35. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 4289–4310.

36. Id. at 4320–4330.

37. Supplemental Manifestation to the Joint Manifestation dated October 3, 2025 with Urgent Motion to Resolve dated February 5, 2026.

38. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 1189–1192; 1801–1808. See Advisory dated October 18, 2022 and Revised Advisory dated November 23, 2022.

39. Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 438–439 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

40. Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 943 Phil. 212, 258 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

41. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, 890 Phil. 944, 983 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

42. 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

43. Id. at 883.

44. Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 943 Phil. 212, 258 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

45. Id.

46. Id.

47. 584 Phil. 246 (2008) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

48. Id. at 266.

49. Id.

50. 728 Phil. 535 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

51. Id. at 540.

52. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), p. 3605.

53. Id. at 3604–3605.

54. 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

55. Id. at 754.

56. 433 Phil. 506 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

57. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.

58. 522 Phil. 705 (2015) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

59. 752 Phil. 716 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

60. 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

61. 932 Phil. 753 (2023) [Per J. Gaerlan, En Banc].

62. Id. at 768.

63. See Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, 918-B Phil. 1, 219 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, En Banc]. Wherein the Court acknowledged that existing procedural rules may not be satisfactorily appropriate for the process of proscription of terrorist organization, associations, or groups or persons, if and when an application if filed therefor. Hence, consistent with its rule-making authority of the Court considers it an opportune time to formulate some guidelines to be observed in applying for a proscription order under Section 26 to guide the bench, bar, and public. See also Ocampo v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 932 Phil. 753 (2023) [Per J. Gaerlan, En Banc]. Wherein the Court opted not to evade its duty to resolve the novel issue of what constitutes exploration under CONST., art. XII, sec. 2 for the guidance of the bench and the bar.

64. 354 Phil. 948 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

65. 744 Phil. 451 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

66. 915 Phil. 220 (2021) [Per J. J. Y. Lopez, En Banc].

67. 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

68. See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]; and Villarete v. Commission on Audit, 922 Phil. 743 (2022) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

69. CONST., art. III, sec. 19(1).

70. See Republic v. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc., 824 Phil. 87.(2018) [Per C. J. Sereno, First Division].

71. See 863 Phil. 754, 791 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].

72. Id.

73. Id. at 789–792.

74. Id. at 792.

75. See id.

76. See id. at 793.

77. 683 Phil. 141 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

78. Id. at 170–171.

79. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), p. 14.

80. Id. at 15.

81. Id. at 2691, 3114–3115.

82. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 3257–3263.

83. 942 Phil. 1 (2023) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

84. Id. at 42, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 586 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc] and Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 250–251 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

85. 836 Phil. 205 (2018).

86. Id. at 257–258.

87. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), p. 2795;

88. 686 Phil. 786 (2012) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

89. Id. at 797. (Citations omitted)

90. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), p. 3.

91. Id. at 6–7.

92. 849 Phil. 120 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].

93. Id. at 166–167. (Citation omitted)

94. See Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

95. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, 890 Phil. 944, 991 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

96. Rollo (G.R. No. 262192), p. 1911.

97. Asia United Bank v. Goodland, Co., Inc., 660 Phil. 504, 514 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division] cited in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 947 Phil. 157, 195 (2023) [Per J. Zalameda, En Banc].

98. Pentacapital Investment Corporation v. Mahinay, 637 Phil. 283, 309 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division] cited in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 947 Phil. 157, 196 (2023) [Per J. Zalameda, En Banc].

99. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 947 Phil. 157, 196 (2023) [Per J. Zalameda, En Banc] citing Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., 911 Phil. 301, 308 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].

100. Rollo (G.R. No. 261892), pp. 3269–3271.

101. Id. at 3232–3234.

102. Rollo, (G.R. No. 263752), p. 159.

103. Id. at 40–41. The relevant portion reads:

7. We hereby disclose that we have commenced a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila[,] Branch 16 with Case No. R-MNL-22-01122-SC.

8. The above petition was initially dismissed but is currently suspended in light of the trial court's decision to defer its resolution on our pending motion for reconsideration. The trial court's order to defer the proceedings was made as a judicial courtesy to the Honorable Supreme Court.

104. See Buan v. Lopez. 229 Phil. 65 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

105. RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, sec. 5, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, May 1, 2020.